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Private-sector unionism, the institution that has historically represented
and advocated on behalf of workers in capitalist economies, is in decline 
in the United States. At this writing, union density has fallen into single
digits in the private sector and shows little or no sign of reviving, despite a
major eﬀort by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and many aﬃliated unions to organize new
workers. Falling union density is not unique to the United States, however.
Density has dropped in several countries in the European Union (EU),
Japan, New Zealand, and Australia as well.
But declines in density have a much greater impact on workers in the
United States than in Western Europe or Japan and in most other coun-
tries. The reason is that the United States lacks institutional alternatives to
trade unions to provide workers with collective voice. In Western Europe,
falling union membership does not reduce workers’ voice at their work-
place because EU law provides for elected works councils at workplaces. In
Japan, nonunion workers have some voice at their workplace because
Japan’s consensual style of labor relations creates scope for workers to ex-
press their views outside of union settings. By contrast, U.S. law makes al-
ternative forms of collective voice diﬃcult to attain, due to the Wagner
Act’s outlawing organizations weaker than independent unions. Manage-
ment’s fear that any form of independent collective voice will lead to full
unionization makes it diﬃcult for workers to represent themselves as a
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In the face of this development, labor activists, workers, and non-
governmental organizations concerned with the well-being of workers have
sought to develop alternative ways to represent workers’ interests. They
have formed diverse nonmembership organizations (NMOs) or have al-
tered the operations of member-based organizations, such as occupational
associations, to perform some of the functions that traditional unions un-
dertake on behalf of workers.
What is the nature of these new institutions? How do they operate? How
eﬀective have they been in providing services or voice to workers compared
to unions? Do the new institutions have the breadth and scope to expand
in the labor market and substitute at least in part for traditional unions, or
are they likely to be limited to small niches?
These questions motivate the research in this volume. Because the new
labor institutions of concern have short histories, much of the research
takes a case study approach, describing the history and operation of par-
ticular innovative institutions. The purpose of the volume, however, is nei-
ther to produce deﬁnitive case histories nor to illuminate the idiosyncrasies
of particular institutions. Rather, it is to understand the behavior of the
new institutions within the framework of the standard economic analysis
of optimizing agents. This framework directs attention at the goals of the
new labor institutions—their maximands, as it were; the constraints on
their actions; and the way in which they respond to parametric changes in
economic and other incentives.
At the heart of this volume is the diﬀerence between membership-based
nonunion organizations, where members have some direct say in the way
the institution operates, and non-membership organizations, which ac-
tivists form and run on behalf of workers. There is nothing new about
membership-based nonunion labor organizations. In most professional
occupations, there is an association that provides information, holds meet-
ings, and represents the occupation to the public. Workers join these or-
ganizations when they believe it beneﬁts them. Economists join the Amer-
ican Economic Association. Convention managers join the Professional
Convention Managers Association. Scientists join the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, and so on. In all of these cases work-
ers establish a traditional principal-agent relation with their organization.
What is new is the pressure on these organizations to take on more of the
functions of trade unions in the wake of union decline.
Labor analysts have not studied nonunion labor organizations to the
same extent that they have studied trade unions, but there is no qualitative
diﬀerence between modeling how a union operates on behalf of its mem-
bers and how a nonunion labor organization operates on behalf of its
members. In both cases, the economists’ natural inclination is to treat the
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mizing organizations stretches back at least to the union maximand mod-
els of Dunlop (1944) and proceeds through the analysis of unions as re-
sponding to median members in Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984). The key
issue in maximand models of unions has been the relative importance of
wages and employment as union goals in collective bargaining. By focus-
ing on these two outcomes to the exclusion of others, the models ignore
much of what unions do at workplaces. Median member models stress that
senior immobile workers have a greater impact on outcomes than they
would in nonunion markets, which respond to younger marginal workers.
But, just as in median voter models in political science, median voter mod-
els of unions fail to allow for side bargains among groups, diﬀerences be-
tween active and nonactive members, and so on. Optimizing models of
these kinds give analysts a framework in which to think about the factors
that aﬀect union decisions (Farber 1986) but have not succeeded beyond
that. We see no reason to expect these models to be any more or less suc-
cessful in accounting for the behavior of nonunion membership-based or-
ganizations than they have been of trade unions.
Nonmember-based organizations diﬀer substantively from member-
ship-based organizations and require a diﬀerent framework for analysis.
From the perspective of principal-agent theory, what is distinctive about
NMOs is that the agents or activists select groups of workers as their prin-
cipals—a reversal of the relation in the standard principal-agent model in
which the principals select the agents. Legal services centers choose to de-
fend workers in some areas on some issues. Antisweatshop activists make
the well-being of workers in less-developed countries their cause. In neither
case do the workers choose the lawyers or the activists to represent them.
Because nonmember organizations have only recently attained some im-
portance in the labor market, the analyses in this volume represent the ﬁrst
serious attempt to consider how they operate. The organizations have to
please two quite diﬀerent groups to survive. Because they have no members
and thus no dues, NMOs have to raise resources from outside funders and
thus must be responsive to those funders. Christine Jolls’s analysis in chap-
ter 4 gives a detailed discussion of this problem in the case of lawyers’
groups who seek to aid workers. At the same time, the NMO must meet the
potentially diﬀerent needs of the workers it seeks to represent or service. In
simplest form, we can think of the NMO as having to ﬁnd the intersection
of the two sets of interests in some space of actions, as shown in the Venn
diagram of ﬁgure 1. Within that intersection, the NMO or its leadership
presumably has freedom to exercise its own preferences about what is more
important. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman’s analysis of an-
tisweatshop organizations—which must gain the support of Western con-
sumers to pressure ﬁrms to improve conditions in developing countries and
which must demand “reasonable changes” to help the workers they seek to
Introduction 3represent—documents the way this process operates. They stress the entre-
preneurial skills that activists must have to succeed.
A key question for this volume is the extent to which, if at all, the emerg-
ing labor institutions might substitute for declining unionism. This ques-
tion has two parts: whether the new NMOs (or nonunion membership-
based organizations) can provide services and representation of workers
comparable to those of unions, and whether they can expand their reach to
service as large a proportion of the work force that traditionally relied on
unions as the worker-oriented institutions in the labor market. The studies
in the volume answer both questions in the negative. The new institutions
have a long way to go before they will be able to provide remotely compa-
rable economic beneﬁts to unions. Even in their weakened state, unions
have major eﬀects on wages and beneﬁts, according to the analysis by
Thomas C. Buchmeuller, John E. DiNardo, and Robert G. Valleta in chap-
ter 7, which none of the new organizations studied in this book have come
close to replicating, including the Working Today eﬀort to provide selective
group beneﬁts studied by Joni Hersch in chapter 6. In addition, the new in-
stitutions have not managed to expand beyond small niches in the labor
market. One of the most successful community based groups, the Indus-
trial Areas Foundation discussed by Lisa M. Lynch in chapter 9, has suc-
ceeded in improving pay and training in San Antonio, Texas but has not
been able to mimic that success broadly.
David Weil’s analysis in chapter 1 provides some reasons for the negative
answer to the question about whether the new institutions can substitute
for unions. Weil presents a broad overview of the requisite activities any
new institution will have to undertake to assist workers in exercising their
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Fig. 1 Nonmembership-based organizations must seek intersection between fun-
ders’ interests and workers’ interestrights. Whatever its organizational form—a trade union, a legal aid group,
a narrowly focused membership organization, or a myriad of other possi-
bilities—any agent for workers must deal with the standard “free-rider”
problem. Activities that beneﬁt workers in the totality, such as enforcing
workplace rights, generate positive externalities so that the marginal ben-
eﬁt for the workplace as a whole is always greater than for any individual
worker. Any labor organization must ﬁnd ways to overcome this problem
at the workplace. There is also the standard collective action problem. The
marginal costs of exercising rights are likely to be lower for a group of
workers than for a single individual. This combination implies that the out-
come of individual action is likely to be inferior to the socially optimal
level. But reaching the socially optimal level of group activity requires
some mechanism or institution that aggregates worker preferences and re-
duces the marginal costs of exercising rights. Because the beneﬁts of group
activity require a signiﬁcant number of persons to be involved, a key issue
is how the institutions deal with the free-rider problem. Considering all of
these requirements, Weil concludes that it is unlikely that a single nonunion
institution can eﬀectively implement worker rights, but he suggests that
some mixture of groups could ﬁll the gap left by the decline of unions. Al-
ternatively, it is possible that union experiments with diﬀerent forms of rep-
resenting workers, such as the open-source unionism proposed by Free-
man and Rogers (2002)—in which unions use the Internet to reduce the
costs of servicing workers and form non-majority organizations inside
ﬁrms—might evolve in ways that would ﬁll the gap. But this volume did not
explore that possibility.
The empirical parts of the book investigate the performance of some in-
novative alternative labor market organizations and initiatives in three
parts. The ﬁrst part deals with nonmembership activist organizations. The
second section addresses how membership-based organizations attract
members. The third section examines evolving union and related initia-
tives. The strategies and focus of these eﬀorts are quite diﬀerent, although
all are initiatives that attempt to mobilize group action to solve workplace
problems or improve workers’ economic status.
Table 1 provides a broad overview of the institutions that the various
chapters examine. The table delineates six characteristics of each of the la-
bor institutions studied: the nature of the workers’ problem that they try to
address; the potential market failure that created the problem; whether the
organization is membership based; its source of power and limits on that
power; the funding source of the organization; and its success. We review
brieﬂy the studies in each area that underlie the summaries in the table.
Part I: Studies of Nonworker Organizations
Three chapters analyze the way NMOs operate in assisting workers.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































spaigns, and lawyers’ groups that assist workers in enforcing employment
rights. The distinguishing feature of these initiatives and organizations is
that the workers they represent do not run these organizations either di-
rectly or indirectly through elected leaders. Without a membership base,
these organizations need alternative sources of funding, which oftentimes
include ﬁnancial support from unions or private donors. Some lawyers’
groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and legal ser-
vices centers, have a long history of helping workers with their legal prob-
lems. The antisweatshop initiatives of human rights activists and living-
wage campaigns are more recent and aim to raise earnings and improve
working conditions for low-wage workers in developing countries and in
local U.S. communities, respectively. These two types of campaigns have
much in common. Both mobilize community groups as well as student ac-
tivists and political and religious groups. Both depend on unions for some
ﬁnancial support, and the unions look upon these campaigns both as ways
to help nonunion workers and as an organizing tool.
While most of the institutions studied in this volume endeavor to help
workers directly, the human rights vigilantes who run antisweatshop cam-
paigns do not operate in the developing countries where they seek to
improve conditions. They mobilize consumers in advanced countries to
pressure ﬁrms for better treatment of workers. In chapter 2, Elliott and
Freeman document that consumers care about labor standards and are
willing to pay more for products made under better conditions and are un-
willing to buy products made under certiﬁably bad conditions, such as
child labor operating in horriﬁc sweatshops. They note that human rights
vigilantes have successfully raised public visibility of labor rights after such
concerns had been dormant for years. These campaigns work because they
gain media attention and involve churches and other morally concerned
groups. The antisweatshop campaigns are among the few eﬀorts that have
mobilized student activists in recent years and almost the only area where
unions have been instrumental in generating student activism.
Can consumer concern over labor standards be mobilized to improve
worker conditions broadly? Based on the human rights campaigns, the eﬃ-
cacy of such consumer-driven movements is limited. Market pressures help
drive such campaigns, yet, as Elliott and Freeman’s survey data document,
there is a limit to the price consumers will pay to purchase products made
under good labor conditions. It is diﬃcult to monitor whether ﬁrms com-
ply with labor standards. In some cases, antisweatshop campaigns be-
neﬁted from a series of circumstances that would be hard to predict or
replicate. And even in the best of cases, the campaigns are limited to im-
proving labor conditions for workers producing branded products for
export to Western consumers. The campaigns have increased corporate
codes of conduct in addressing labor standards, but Elliott and Freeman’s
assessment of whether targeted ﬁrms have changed their behavior is
guarded. They conclude that to expand the number of workers who beneﬁt
Introduction 7from the antisweatshop campaigns beyond a very small number requires
governmental actions and the rejuvenated International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO), which has received more resources to deal with labor standards
issues, especially child labor, but which is dependent on the states, unions,
and employer groups that constitute its membership.
A more direct approach than using consumer pressure to inﬂuence
ﬁrms’ treatment of workers is found in the living-wage referendum move-
ment. Living-wage campaigns seek to raise the minimum wage that must
be met by city contractors and/or those beneﬁting from municipal eco-
nomic development programs. In chapter 3, Jared Bernstein reviews living-
wage campaigns. Bernstein notes the rapid rise in living wage ordinances
in the late 1990s/early 2000s, including ordinances in Baltimore, Boston,
New York, and Los Angeles. Critics of such campaigns cite the potential
for economic distortion and weaker local competitiveness, but Bernstein
reports little evidence of adverse eﬀects on employment, in part because
the laws are targeted at small groups of workers in ﬁrms with municipal
contracts.
A third source of nonmembership activism is lawyers’ groups, many of
which have helped workers with legal problems for decades. The United
States has a substantial and expanding set of laws governing the workplace.
But as Weil’s analysis points out, however, in the absence of an agent to
solve the public goods problem or to lower the costs to workers, laws are
not likely to be optimally implemented and enforced. Unions have been ac-
tive participants in enforcing employment laws, so the decline of unionism
may further erode eﬀective implementation and enforcement. Jolls notes in
chapter 4 that hiring a private lawyer, the usual procedure of an aggrieved
party who believes that someone has violated their legal rights, is less eﬀec-
tive in the employment context for a number of reasons. Paying for a lawyer
on an hourly basis is not ﬁnancially feasible for lower-income workers, and
contingent fee arrangements are generally not attractive to lawyers be-
cause damages in employment cases are typically small. Jolls describes two
types of lawyers groups, national issues organizations and legal services
centers, which help bridge the gap between the law “on the books” and the
law “in action.” National issues organizations focus on one or more broad-
based issues and are primarily funded by private donations, and legal ser-
vices organizations serve low-income individuals and are funded by the
government. Jolls notes that given the funding distinction, it is not sur-
prising that national issues organizations focus on a few high-proﬁle, pub-
licly-charged issues, such as discrimination, that attract private donations.
In contrast, legal services centers focus on less controversial cases, such as
unemployment beneﬁts; handle a large number of cases; and are frequently
explicitly restricted from handling discrimination suits. A key ﬁnding is
that as a consequence of the funding structure, there is a gap with little pro-
vision of impact claims in mundane areas and day-to-day claims in high-
8 Richard B. Freeman and Joni Herschproﬁle areas. For example, low-wage workers are unlikely to have legal rep-
resentation for a discrimination claim.
Part II: Studies of Membership-Based Initiatives
The two chapters in part II analyze the possibility that a membership or-
ganization—either union or nonunion—could represent white-collar
workers, who increasingly dominate the economy but have traditionally
been nonunion. Unions have had some success with white-collar workers
in the public sector but represent few privately employed white-collar
workers, especially in newer industries. Workers in newer, high-tech indus-
tries often have no experience with unions and see them as alien to their
workplaces and employers. Factory workers may need unions, but pro-
grammers or engineers at IBM? The chapters in this section explore what
attracts nonunion workers to join some type of representational member-
ship organization, as well as examine their prospect of survival without
union’s legal rights to represent workers.
In chapter 5, Richard W. Hurd and John Bunge analyze a new survey of
white-collar workers who experienced a union organizing campaign. The
survey probes the attitudes of white-collar workers regarding the choice of
a professional association versus unionization to represent their interests.
Hurd and Bunge found a signiﬁcant division among workers. Those favor-
ing professional organizations feared that unions may create conﬂict at
work or cause a loss of personal freedom and preferred an organization
that developed a cooperative relationship with management. By contrast,
union supporters were drawn to direct action and aggressive organizations
that focus on terms and conditions of employment and workplace rights.
At present, existing organizations have failed to meet the needs of these
two groups. Unions have traditionally not appealed enough to the profes-
sional interests of employees who favor professional associations. Profes-
sional associations routinely eschew any form of union-like activity, al-
though under pressure, even the American Medical Association has come
to accept collective bargaining in its chapters that favor the union route.
But for the most part, associations concentrate on issues such as licensing
and professional opportunities rather than workplace concerns where the
interests of workers and management may diﬀer. Hurd and Bunge con-
clude that it is unlikely that unions will successfully expand coverage
among white-collar workers unless they oﬀer a substantially diﬀerent set 
of services or adopt a substantially diﬀerent strategic approach to better
match the preferences and address the speciﬁc concerns of these workers.
In chapter 6, Hersch analyzes the organizational strategy of Work-
ing Today, a new organization that is striving to ﬁll the lack of representa-
tion for professional and other white-collar workers. Working Today was
founded to be a broadly based membership organization that represents all
Introduction 9workers, with a special focus on independent workers. But its original de-
sign did not succeed, so the organization evolved. The evolution of Work-
ing Today demonstrates the challenge a new organization faces as it at-
tempts to gain membership and, with membership, adequate funding for
survival. In contrast to professional organizations considered by Hurd and
Bunge, a broadly based organization lacks a natural constituency. Hersch
models the organization in terms of generating revenues to fund its activi-
ties and building its membership base by oﬀering public goods attractive to
donors and private goods that attract individual membership. But Work-
ing Today largely failed to attract individual dues-paying members to sup-
port its public goods function of representing independent workers so that
its ﬁnancial survival depends on its serving as an intermediary for private
selective beneﬁts, especially group health insurance. Hersch’s analysis of
data on health insurance coverage suggests that, as most of the indepen-
dent workers that would be attractive to insurers are already covered, an
organization focused on provision of health insurance may reach a limited
scale, which thereby limits the potential inﬂuence on the labor market at
large.
Part III: New Union Opportunities and Initiatives
The chapters in part III examine potential opportunities to reinvigorate
traditional unionism by considering the roles of nonwage beneﬁts, union-
management strategic partnerships, and expanded training opportunities.
Using several data sets covering three decades of union activity, Buch-
mueller, DiNardo, and Valletta examine the union eﬀect on work hours
and nonwage beneﬁts in chapter 7. Their analysis demonstrates that for a
worker with the attributes of a typical union member, a union job is asso-
ciated with fewer hours worked, more vacation time, and higher health in-
surance and pension oﬀer rates. While the union edge in hours worked per
week and in beneﬁt provision, especially health insurance, seems to have
narrowed over time as union density has fallen, the union advantage re-
mains substantial and oﬀers members economic advantages far above
those of any nonunion alternative. The ability of unions to form an actu-
arially attractive group stands in contrast to the attempt at beneﬁts provi-
sion of an organization like Working Today.
There have been various forms of worker involvement in ﬁrm decision
making, such as quality of work life and high-performance work systems.
For the most part these programs provide some representation for workers
at the worksite on day-to-day decisions but stop short of involving work-
ers in the key strategic decisions such as downsizing, divesting divisions, or
relocating operations. In chapter 8, Eileen Appelbaum and Larry W. Hunter
examine two institutions that allow strategic participation for unions: ne-
gotiated union-management partnership decisions and union representa-
10 Richard B. Freeman and Joni Herschtion on corporate boards. Strategic partnerships allow some degree of
union participation in decisions involving ﬁnancial planning, corporate
strategy, investments, technology, and production processes. Although co-
operative arrangement between union and management seems to oﬀer
much to both parties, there are substantial barriers to strategic partner-
ships. Legal constraints limit union participation on corporate boards as
corporate boards are required to represent shareholders, and shareholder
interests will frequently be in conﬂict with the preferences of workers. In-
deed, unions have good reason for distancing themselves from decisions
that may have adverse consequences for their membership. Appelbaum
and Hunter’s survey of strategic partnerships indicates that employee in-
volvement at the higher levels of corporate power are rare. Unlike the
legally mandated works council or codetermination that exist in many Eu-
ropean countries, in the United States such partnership agreements are not
part of the legal landscape. Appelbaum and Hunter conclude by noting
that the legal context is an essential component of the form and success of
such partnerships.
In chapter 9, Lynch examines new community-based private-sector
training initiatives. Because workers in unionized ﬁrms are more likely to
receive training than other workers, the decline in unionization may lower
the level of training in the economy. This creates a potential market failure
for the provision of training. Nonunion training intermediaries need to be
able to enforce long-term agreements between employers and workers,
identify workers missed by traditional recruiting eﬀorts, monitor training
quality, and oﬀer training beyond a single employer—that is, to exploit
economies of scale. Without a proven track record, it can be diﬃcult for
training intermediaries to secure a reliable source of funding. Lynch pro-
vides an overview of a number of training intermediaries.
Conclusion
That all of the emerging labor institutions considered in this volume are
struggling to develop strategies and tactics to survive and expand in the
economic world is not surprising. We chose to study organizations in a
formative or developmental stage to capture the process of adaptation and
emergence in much the same way that analysts of industrial organization
might study newly formed ﬁrms, knowing full well that 80 percent or more
are unlikely to survive, or that evolutionary biologists might examine a set
of mutations, knowing full well that few will pass the test of natural selec-
tion. This volume is just the ﬁrst chapter in what may be a long story of in-
novations by nonmember organizations, by professional and other non-
union organizations, and by unions to ﬁnd the best way to represent the
interests of labor in an economic environment where traditional unionism
is greatly weakened.
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